Thirteen US Senators, including leading members of the Banking Committee have expressed concern with the consequences of replacing a market-based system for debit card acceptances with a government-controlled system pursuant to Section 1075 of the Dodd-Frank Act. In a bi-partisan letter to Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, the senators said that having the government fix prices in any venue is a bad idea. As the Fed implements Section 1075, the senators want to ensure that all costs to the issuers and economic value to the merchants are considered in the regulations. The senators urged the Fed to take the time to consider all the implications of implementing Section 1075 and exercise the discretion granted by Dodd-Frank to minimize negative consequences. The letter was signed by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), the Banking Committee’s Ranking Member, and two influential members of the committee, Senators Mark Warner (D-VA) and Bob Corker (R-TN).
Section 1075 requires that the Fed issue by April 21, 2011 three final rules on interchange fees regarding a reasonable and proportional debit fee structure, fees for fraud prevention on debit transactions, and debit transaction network fees. There is a statutory exemption for small issuers under $10 billion in assets from the new debit fee rules.
During what the senators described as a ``very limited debate’’ on the Senate floor, the debt interchange fee amendment was presented as a pro-consumer provision that would lower costs for customers who use debit cards. However, since passage of Dodd-Frank Section 1075, analyst reports for retailers likely to be affected by the provision make no mention of any benefits to consumers. Indeed, many predict that consumers will be faced with additional bank fees as the rule is implemented.
In addition, the senators said that there is a misconception that the small bank exemption will level the playing field for financial institutions under $10 billion. They are concerned that the statute will make small bank and credit union debit cards more expensive for merchants to accept that those issued by larger financial institutions and would likely put them at a disadvantage compared to large issuers
Friday, December 31, 2010
Thursday, December 30, 2010
President Signs Legislation Amending Dodd-Frank to Provide Full FDIC Protection for Lawyer Trust Accounts
The President signed legislation yesterday amending Section 343 of the Dodd Frank Act to assure continued full FDIC protection for lawyer trust accounts. The current Term Asset Guarantee program under which the FDIC guarantees the total amount of client funds maintained in lawyer trust accounts expires December 31, 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act creates an equivalent program, running for 2 years beginning January 1, 2011, but makes several changes, including a more narrow definition of a covered account. In what appears to have been a drafting error, lawyer trust accounts were not covered under the new program established by the Dodd-Frank Act. The legislation, HR 6398, corrects that inadvertent omission so that the accounts are fully insured. The President is expected to sign the legislation.
A Senate amendment to HR 6398 that would have clarified that derivatives trades by commercial end-users are not subject to margin requirements did not make it into the final legislation. The amendment was sponsored by Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Ranking Member on the Agriculture Committee, and Senator Bob Corker R-TN), a leading member of the Banking Committee, and supported by, among others, the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
The Senate passed the legislation by unanimous consent on December 22, 2010. Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Ore) explained that in all fifty states lawyers have to put clients’ funds into trust accounts. Under the law, they are not allowed to earn interest on these accounts. Over time, however, an arrangement has been worked out whereby the banks pay interest, but it does not go to the clients; it goes to fund civil legal services for those who cannot afford those services. The Dodd-Frank Act as passed put this arrangement in great jeopardy and the legislation is designed to fix the problem.
Without the legislation, explained Sen. Merkley, lawyers applying their fiduciary duty would have had to withdraw their funds from these interest bearing accounts and put them in non-interest bearing accounts. Similarly, Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA) noted that an unintended consequence of the Dodd-Frank legislation with regard to interest on lawyer trust accounts is that, without the HR 6398 fix, we would have had thousands of escrow accounts held by law firms and attorneys, real estate transactions, dispute resolution transactions, and beneficial programs that would have had to be spread among many more banks because the insurance level drops. It would have forced the transfer of escrow account money out of a number of banks. At a time when capital is critical in small community banks, the unintended consequence might have been to take them below tier one capital requirements and put them in a stress situation. (Cong. Record, Dec. 22, 2010, pS10964).
Rep. Lloyd Doggett, (D-TX), the House sponsor of HR 6398, noted that at a time when interest rates are at an all-time low, it is particularly important that there be a complete government-backed guarantee against any loss on these trust accounts. He also said that such protection also ensures that small, independent banks are on a level playing field with their larger competitors in securing these trust fund deposits. (Cong. Record, The legislation is supported by a broad range of groups, including the Independent Community Bankers of America and the American Bar Association.
A Senate amendment to HR 6398 that would have clarified that derivatives trades by commercial end-users are not subject to margin requirements did not make it into the final legislation. The amendment was sponsored by Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Ranking Member on the Agriculture Committee, and Senator Bob Corker R-TN), a leading member of the Banking Committee, and supported by, among others, the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
The Senate passed the legislation by unanimous consent on December 22, 2010. Senator Jeff Merkley (D-Ore) explained that in all fifty states lawyers have to put clients’ funds into trust accounts. Under the law, they are not allowed to earn interest on these accounts. Over time, however, an arrangement has been worked out whereby the banks pay interest, but it does not go to the clients; it goes to fund civil legal services for those who cannot afford those services. The Dodd-Frank Act as passed put this arrangement in great jeopardy and the legislation is designed to fix the problem.
Without the legislation, explained Sen. Merkley, lawyers applying their fiduciary duty would have had to withdraw their funds from these interest bearing accounts and put them in non-interest bearing accounts. Similarly, Senator Johnny Isakson (R-GA) noted that an unintended consequence of the Dodd-Frank legislation with regard to interest on lawyer trust accounts is that, without the HR 6398 fix, we would have had thousands of escrow accounts held by law firms and attorneys, real estate transactions, dispute resolution transactions, and beneficial programs that would have had to be spread among many more banks because the insurance level drops. It would have forced the transfer of escrow account money out of a number of banks. At a time when capital is critical in small community banks, the unintended consequence might have been to take them below tier one capital requirements and put them in a stress situation. (Cong. Record, Dec. 22, 2010, pS10964).
Rep. Lloyd Doggett, (D-TX), the House sponsor of HR 6398, noted that at a time when interest rates are at an all-time low, it is particularly important that there be a complete government-backed guarantee against any loss on these trust accounts. He also said that such protection also ensures that small, independent banks are on a level playing field with their larger competitors in securing these trust fund deposits. (Cong. Record, The legislation is supported by a broad range of groups, including the Independent Community Bankers of America and the American Bar Association.
Rep. Bachus Urges Fed to Go Slow on Regulations Implementing Dodd-Frank Interchange Fee Provision
The incoming Chair of the House Financial Services Committee has voiced concern over pace of the Fed’s efforts to implement the derivatives regulatory regime mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. In a letter to Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL) questioned the feasibility of the required nine-month deadline under Section 1075 of Dodd-Frank to adopt rules on debit card interchange fees and routing. Given the broad scope of this required rulemaking and the enormity of its potential impact, Rep. Bachus doubted that the extremely short timeframe would be sufficient to produce thorough and thoughtful final rules that consider the myriad perspectives of all affected parties. He cautioned that hastily written rules may end up doing more harm than good to consumers and have negative effects on competition in the marketplace. He added that proceeding cautiously with the regulations will also allow Congress the opportunity to conduct its own review of the intent and impact of the changes enacted in Section 1075 as part of its vigorous oversight of the Dodd- Frank Act. The letter was signed by Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), the incoming Vice-Chair of the oversight committee.
Section 1075 requires that the Fed issue by April 21, 2011 three final rules on interchange fees regarding a reasonable and proportional debit fee structure, fees for fraud prevention on debit transactions, and debit transaction network fees. There is a statutory exemption for small issuers under $10 billion in assets from the new debit fee rules.Section 1075 also requires the Fed to produce new rules regarding the routing of transactions on payment card networks by July 21, 2011.
These rules pose important public policy questions, said the new Chair, and there are concerns regarding whether the Fed has had the time and input it needs to best address the intent of the statute. He noted that Congress devoted little if any time to considering the impact of these changes before Section 1075 was enacted into law, with the House Financial Services Committee holding only one hearing on the general subject of interchange over the last two years and none on the subject of routing. Additionally, some concerns have been raised that, despite its intent, the small issuers' exemption may end up creating an unlevel playing field in the industry that hurts small issuers like community banks and credit unions by making their cards more expensive for merchants to accept. In the Chair’s view, such an outcome would run contrary to the general goal of benefiting consumers and promoting competition that we all share.
Section 1075 requires that the Fed issue by April 21, 2011 three final rules on interchange fees regarding a reasonable and proportional debit fee structure, fees for fraud prevention on debit transactions, and debit transaction network fees. There is a statutory exemption for small issuers under $10 billion in assets from the new debit fee rules.Section 1075 also requires the Fed to produce new rules regarding the routing of transactions on payment card networks by July 21, 2011.
These rules pose important public policy questions, said the new Chair, and there are concerns regarding whether the Fed has had the time and input it needs to best address the intent of the statute. He noted that Congress devoted little if any time to considering the impact of these changes before Section 1075 was enacted into law, with the House Financial Services Committee holding only one hearing on the general subject of interchange over the last two years and none on the subject of routing. Additionally, some concerns have been raised that, despite its intent, the small issuers' exemption may end up creating an unlevel playing field in the industry that hurts small issuers like community banks and credit unions by making their cards more expensive for merchants to accept. In the Chair’s view, such an outcome would run contrary to the general goal of benefiting consumers and promoting competition that we all share.
Former SEC Commissioners Urge Supreme Court to End Circuit Split and Apply Efficient Market Theory to Loss Causation Element of Rule 10b-5
Three former SEC Commissioners and a former General Counsel have asked the US Supreme Court to resolve the split among the federal courts of appeal and rule that the efficient market theory that underlies the fraud-on-the-market reliance element of Rule 10b-5 must be equally applied to the antifraud rule’s loss causation and materiality elements. In an amicus brief, the former Commissioners said that this means applying the fundamental premise of the efficient market theory that the company’s stock price immediately reacts to new information. The former SEC officials also contended that the instant ruling by the Ninth Circuit panel represents an unwarranted expansion of the Rule 10b-5 implied cause of action that threatens the careful balance Congress has struck in securities fraud actions. Amici are former Commissioners Charles Cox, Joseph Grundfest, and Roberta Karmel and former SEC General Counsel Simon Lorne. . Apollo Group, Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Dkt. No. 10-649.
Unlike traditional fraud actions, noted amici, modern securities fraud class actions depend on a series of presumptions and methods of proof that substitute for the traditional forms of evidence such as investor testimony. In almost every Rule 10b-5 class action investor reliance on the alleged misrepresentations is presumed on the theory that the impersonal market swiftly assimilates all new material information and incorporates it in securities prices. This presumption was enshrined in Rule 10b-5 by the Supreme Court in its 1988 opinion in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, which formally adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory of investor reliance.
Judicial acceptance of the efficient market theory of swift market incorporation of new, material information gave plaintiffs a powerful weapon since by pleading and proving that a market is efficient they can recover damages without proof that anyone actually relied on an alleged misrepresentation, based on the theory that the unsleeping eye of the market took notice and incorporated the misrepresentation into its prices.
But the circuit courts of appeal have split over how to apply the efficient market theory to market responses to true information for purposes of proving the elements of loss causation and materiality under Rule 10b-5. Some Circuits hold that if the market fails to react to an initial corrective disclosure of facts, the plaintiffs cannot prove that such disclosures were the cause of their losses, even if those losses followed some later disclosure repackaging and commenting on the same facts.
The Ninth Circuit, in this case, took the opposite view. The market for the company’s stock, whose efficiency was presumed for purposes of reliance, did not show a statistically significant response to initial reports of an adverse report by the Department of Education that undermined the company’s prior statements, nor to subsequent extensive press reports detailing the troublesome findings of that report. Yet, noted the former Commissioners, the Ninth Circuit found it legally permissible for plaintiffs to establish loss causation. from the market’s delayed reaction to the analyst reports and to recover damages from the days when the original facts were disclosed. It is the view of amici that, under the efficient capital market theory as it is applied to the reliance inquiry, and as it is applied in other Circuits to materiality and loss causation, this is not a permissible result.
Further, in amici’s view, the split among the Circuits creates an unpredictable landscape for securities class actions and encourages forum shopping in search of courts that will judicially expand the boundaries of recoverable losses. The Ninth Circuit’s rule leaves the determination of recoverable losses under Rule 10b-5 uncertain from case to case and Circuit to Circuit, and untethered from the efficient market theory that gives the claim life in the first instance.
The former SEC Commissioners urged the Court to put an end to the confusion by granting certiorari and clarifying that any lawsuit using the efficient capital market theory to establish the reliance element of the claim must apply the same theory to establish the materiality and loss causation elements as well. If the efficient market theory is to form the basis of a lawsuit, they reasoned, it must be applied consistently to all elements of the claim.
Amici also argued that the Ninth Circuit’s loss causation amounts to a judicial expansion of the implied Rule 10b-5 cause of action, enabling plaintiffs to selectively use the efficient capital market theory to sustain a presumption of reliance while disregarding precisely the same theory for purposes of proving loss causation and materiality. Noting that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected such expansions, the former Commissioners invited the Court to take this opportunity to rein in unreasonable extensions of the efficient markets theory.
Moreover, judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5 upsets the careful balance the securities laws strike between compensating fraud victims and protecting capital markets from the damaging effects of frivolous litigation. Congress has not been silent in striking this balance, noted the former SEC officials, but has actively and repeatedly legislated in this area. For example, the loss causation provisions applicable to Rule 10b-5 claims were enacted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 against the backdrop of the efficient-market presumption in Basic. If Congress had wanted to provide a more expansive method of proving damages, reasoned the former SEC Commissioners, it could have done so.
Unlike traditional fraud actions, noted amici, modern securities fraud class actions depend on a series of presumptions and methods of proof that substitute for the traditional forms of evidence such as investor testimony. In almost every Rule 10b-5 class action investor reliance on the alleged misrepresentations is presumed on the theory that the impersonal market swiftly assimilates all new material information and incorporates it in securities prices. This presumption was enshrined in Rule 10b-5 by the Supreme Court in its 1988 opinion in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, which formally adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory of investor reliance.
Judicial acceptance of the efficient market theory of swift market incorporation of new, material information gave plaintiffs a powerful weapon since by pleading and proving that a market is efficient they can recover damages without proof that anyone actually relied on an alleged misrepresentation, based on the theory that the unsleeping eye of the market took notice and incorporated the misrepresentation into its prices.
But the circuit courts of appeal have split over how to apply the efficient market theory to market responses to true information for purposes of proving the elements of loss causation and materiality under Rule 10b-5. Some Circuits hold that if the market fails to react to an initial corrective disclosure of facts, the plaintiffs cannot prove that such disclosures were the cause of their losses, even if those losses followed some later disclosure repackaging and commenting on the same facts.
The Ninth Circuit, in this case, took the opposite view. The market for the company’s stock, whose efficiency was presumed for purposes of reliance, did not show a statistically significant response to initial reports of an adverse report by the Department of Education that undermined the company’s prior statements, nor to subsequent extensive press reports detailing the troublesome findings of that report. Yet, noted the former Commissioners, the Ninth Circuit found it legally permissible for plaintiffs to establish loss causation. from the market’s delayed reaction to the analyst reports and to recover damages from the days when the original facts were disclosed. It is the view of amici that, under the efficient capital market theory as it is applied to the reliance inquiry, and as it is applied in other Circuits to materiality and loss causation, this is not a permissible result.
Further, in amici’s view, the split among the Circuits creates an unpredictable landscape for securities class actions and encourages forum shopping in search of courts that will judicially expand the boundaries of recoverable losses. The Ninth Circuit’s rule leaves the determination of recoverable losses under Rule 10b-5 uncertain from case to case and Circuit to Circuit, and untethered from the efficient market theory that gives the claim life in the first instance.
The former SEC Commissioners urged the Court to put an end to the confusion by granting certiorari and clarifying that any lawsuit using the efficient capital market theory to establish the reliance element of the claim must apply the same theory to establish the materiality and loss causation elements as well. If the efficient market theory is to form the basis of a lawsuit, they reasoned, it must be applied consistently to all elements of the claim.
Amici also argued that the Ninth Circuit’s loss causation amounts to a judicial expansion of the implied Rule 10b-5 cause of action, enabling plaintiffs to selectively use the efficient capital market theory to sustain a presumption of reliance while disregarding precisely the same theory for purposes of proving loss causation and materiality. Noting that the Supreme Court has consistently rejected such expansions, the former Commissioners invited the Court to take this opportunity to rein in unreasonable extensions of the efficient markets theory.
Moreover, judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5 upsets the careful balance the securities laws strike between compensating fraud victims and protecting capital markets from the damaging effects of frivolous litigation. Congress has not been silent in striking this balance, noted the former SEC officials, but has actively and repeatedly legislated in this area. For example, the loss causation provisions applicable to Rule 10b-5 claims were enacted in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 against the backdrop of the efficient-market presumption in Basic. If Congress had wanted to provide a more expansive method of proving damages, reasoned the former SEC Commissioners, it could have done so.
Wednesday, December 29, 2010
Hedge Fund Industry Asks SEC to Require Fund Managers to Disclose Information on Say on Pay Only When They Instructed the Share Voting
Hedge fund managers and other institutional managers should be required to report information to the SEC on say-on-pay voting only when they have instructed an intermediary to vote their shares, according to the hedge fund industry. In a letter to the SEC on the Commission’s proposal requiring institutional investment manager with voting power over a vote on executive compensation to report voting information on Form N-PX, the Managed Funds Association said that reporting information with respect to such non-votes is not required by the Dodd-Frank Act, would be of minimal use to investors, and would be burdensome for managers. Many hedge fund managers would fall within the definition of “institutional investment manager” as proposed in the Release, and thus would be subject to the new reporting requirements.
As fiduciaries, hedge fund and other institutional managers act in the best interests of their clients. Informed by their fiduciary duty to their clients, hedge fund managers determine whether it is in the best interests of their clients for them to participate in shareholder votes. For a variety of reasons, noted the MFA, hedge fund managers may elect to refrain from exercising their voting power. For example, a manager implementing an investment strategy that is designed to achieve returns through short-term trading may determine that the substantial costs associated with tracking votes and identifying matters to be voted outweigh the benefit of participation in the shareholder vote, particularly if the manager is unlikely to continue to hold the shares at the time of the shareholder meeting and beyond.
Moreover, requiring managers that determine not to exercise their voting power to report information about the shareholder vote would not serve any clear policy objective. In the case of a private fund manager, said the MFA, investors in funds it manages are sophisticated individuals and institutions that are aware of the manager’s proxy voting policies. There would seem to be little benefit to such investors or the public generally in requiring reporting and disclosure of voting information if a manager has declined to vote.
Thus, the MFA urged the SEC to require hedge fund managers to report information only when they have instructed an intermediary to vote their shares. In the industry’s view, such a requirement would elicit more useful information from institutional investment managers and avoid imposing an unnecessary cost on investors when managers do not vote their securities, such as those that use investment strategies that are not related to the voting of proxies. This approach would also be consistent with Section 951 of Dodd-Frank, which does not appear to require reporting when a manager has not voted. The statute says that every institutional investment manager subject to Section 13(f) must report how it voted.
The MFA also asked the SEC to modify the proposal to take into account the complex mechanics of proxy voting for institutional managers. While appreciating the goal of requiring managers to report how they have voted, the MFA noted that current portfolio management and custody practices in many cases do not allow an institutional manager to confirm whether its instructions to its broker were followed. In maintaining securities for institutional managers, prime brokers often have authority to lend the securities on behalf of the manager, and may also have authority to re-hypothecate the securities under the terms of their arrangements with the manager. Both securities lending and re-hypothecation have the effect of transferring voting power from the manager to another firm, and may not include a procedure for notifying the manager. For example, a prime broker may loan securities it holds on behalf of institutional managers without identifying which managers’ securities were loaned. As a result, managers may not know over which securities they have voting power at the applicable record date.
Moreover, managers that submit instructions for shares to be voted often are unable to verify that the shares were actually voted according to the instructions due to the number of intermediaries involved in the proxy voting process. The involvement of such intermediaries in the submission of a manager’s shareholder proxies, including proxy voting service providers, custodians, and others, create significant operational challenges to confirming that votes were submitted and recorded by an issuer. A requirement that an institutional manager report on Form N-PX how the shares were actually voted would attach liability to the manager, which would likely be passed through the chain of intermediaries in some manner, further raising the costs and creating additional complications to any confirmation process.
With this in mind, the MFA suggested the proposed rule require instead that each institutional investment manager report on Form N-PX how it instructed the shares to be voted. Such a requirement would continue to provide important information about a manager’s voting on the Section 14A executive compensation matters, and would avoid mandating that managers undertake a new, costly vote confirmation process.
As fiduciaries, hedge fund and other institutional managers act in the best interests of their clients. Informed by their fiduciary duty to their clients, hedge fund managers determine whether it is in the best interests of their clients for them to participate in shareholder votes. For a variety of reasons, noted the MFA, hedge fund managers may elect to refrain from exercising their voting power. For example, a manager implementing an investment strategy that is designed to achieve returns through short-term trading may determine that the substantial costs associated with tracking votes and identifying matters to be voted outweigh the benefit of participation in the shareholder vote, particularly if the manager is unlikely to continue to hold the shares at the time of the shareholder meeting and beyond.
Moreover, requiring managers that determine not to exercise their voting power to report information about the shareholder vote would not serve any clear policy objective. In the case of a private fund manager, said the MFA, investors in funds it manages are sophisticated individuals and institutions that are aware of the manager’s proxy voting policies. There would seem to be little benefit to such investors or the public generally in requiring reporting and disclosure of voting information if a manager has declined to vote.
Thus, the MFA urged the SEC to require hedge fund managers to report information only when they have instructed an intermediary to vote their shares. In the industry’s view, such a requirement would elicit more useful information from institutional investment managers and avoid imposing an unnecessary cost on investors when managers do not vote their securities, such as those that use investment strategies that are not related to the voting of proxies. This approach would also be consistent with Section 951 of Dodd-Frank, which does not appear to require reporting when a manager has not voted. The statute says that every institutional investment manager subject to Section 13(f) must report how it voted.
The MFA also asked the SEC to modify the proposal to take into account the complex mechanics of proxy voting for institutional managers. While appreciating the goal of requiring managers to report how they have voted, the MFA noted that current portfolio management and custody practices in many cases do not allow an institutional manager to confirm whether its instructions to its broker were followed. In maintaining securities for institutional managers, prime brokers often have authority to lend the securities on behalf of the manager, and may also have authority to re-hypothecate the securities under the terms of their arrangements with the manager. Both securities lending and re-hypothecation have the effect of transferring voting power from the manager to another firm, and may not include a procedure for notifying the manager. For example, a prime broker may loan securities it holds on behalf of institutional managers without identifying which managers’ securities were loaned. As a result, managers may not know over which securities they have voting power at the applicable record date.
Moreover, managers that submit instructions for shares to be voted often are unable to verify that the shares were actually voted according to the instructions due to the number of intermediaries involved in the proxy voting process. The involvement of such intermediaries in the submission of a manager’s shareholder proxies, including proxy voting service providers, custodians, and others, create significant operational challenges to confirming that votes were submitted and recorded by an issuer. A requirement that an institutional manager report on Form N-PX how the shares were actually voted would attach liability to the manager, which would likely be passed through the chain of intermediaries in some manner, further raising the costs and creating additional complications to any confirmation process.
With this in mind, the MFA suggested the proposed rule require instead that each institutional investment manager report on Form N-PX how it instructed the shares to be voted. Such a requirement would continue to provide important information about a manager’s voting on the Section 14A executive compensation matters, and would avoid mandating that managers undertake a new, costly vote confirmation process.
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Area Citizen Journalist on FiredUpMissouri's Top Ten Tweeps of 2010
From Fired Up Missouri
--- For your Tuesday afternoon delight, here are few lists of tweeps we follow to stay on top of things. This obviously isn't an endorsement of all of the things these tweeps write, but they'll keep you informed and keep it interesting.It's an honor just to be nominated.
Citizen Journalists/Bloggers:
@rturner229 - Randy Turner of the Turner Report
@eyokley -Eli Yokley of the Fuse joplin(@thefusejoplin)and PoliticMo @PoliticMo).
@stlactivisthub - Adam Shriver of St. Louis Activist Hub.
@TonysKansasCity - Tony's Kansas City
@MBersin - Michael Bersin of Show Me Progress
@ehoffp - Eric Hoffpauir of Show Me Progress
@BHIndepMO - Brandon H. of of Show Me Progress
@BGinKC - Blue Girl of Show Me Progress
@SharkFu of AngryBlackBitch.com
@busplunge - Jim Lee of the Busplunge
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